



U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) Limited User Test (LUT) Final Report

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Executive Summary

Purpose

The Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) Limited User Test (LUT) Independent Evaluation Report (IER) is presented by the CBP Operational Evaluation Branch (OEB); the DHS-designated “ground systems” Operational Test Authority (OTA). The purpose of the IFT LUT IER is to provide senior CBP decision-makers independent, scientifically validated information to support CBP leaders in reducing risk for the IFT acquisition program.

Independent Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) is conducted before each acquisition decision review to provide the decision authority unbiased information and analysis based upon latest results from testing the system’s Critical Operational Issues (COIs). The Independent OT&E design ensures consideration of OEB’s three internal functional OT&E metrics:

- **Adequacy.** The amount of data and realism of test conditions is sufficient to support robust evaluation of the COIs.
- **Quality.** The test planning, control of test events, and treatment of data provides for clear and accurate test reporting.
- **Credibility.** Ensure that external influence and personal biases are separated from the conduct of the test event and data handling.

The Limited User Test (LUT) is an Operational Test (OT) data collection event that is conducted to provide valid, analyzed, *operational* information supporting executive-level management decisions for acquisition programs. Independent Evaluation is the process of analyzing data from all sources (not just OT) using scientific methodology and appropriate statistical tools to prove or disprove a hypothesis. All OT&E is accomplished using incremental cycles of successive mission-based test and evaluation.

Background

The April 2006 Secure Border Initiative (SBI) Mission Need Statement (MNS) documented capability gaps in United States Border Patrol’s (USBP) ability to execute its border security mission. Addressing those gaps, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan identified a number of potential mature technologies availability for deployment while meeting local operational needs and constraints. Senior leadership selected an enhanced capability providing (b) (7)(E) Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) functionality. Senior leadership also determined that the user’s need could be best met by acquiring a non-developmental commercial sensor system providing the (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) capability to improve Items of Interest (IoI) detection, tracking, identification, and classification within a given area of responsibility (AOR). Senior management established the

Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) Program Management Office (IFT PMO) to manage the acquisition process.

Scope

OEB planned and conducted the LUT data collection using controlled condition sets performed in the context of scripted mission based operational scenarios, developmental test and operational test data collected during concurrent CBP live operations. The LUT also incorporated test vignettes and grouped IFT mission tasks to evaluate the performance during scripted and demonstration test events. OEB applies the continuous operational evaluation (COE) methodology to assess the IFT program. This methodology leverages not only the LUT event, but also a modeling and simulation exercise (Simulation Experiment [SIMEX]), the System Acceptance Test (SAT), deployment training and an operator functionality evaluation. Since the IFT system enhances the operator's senses and the IFT operator must interact with the system to make decisions and determine the appropriate actions to take, the operator is considered part of the system.

OT&E Limitations

The LUT is an operational test (OT) and by definition is limited and focused on evaluating first level user priorities or concerns. The LUT findings and recommendations are based on data collected during LUT execution on 26 October through 14 November 2015, as well as previously collected data as noted above.

- **Cybersecurity.** A full system cybersecurity evaluation was not conducted. OEB delayed a comprehensive examination until the system begins connecting to other systems and data sources and DHS Cyber Security OT&E requirements and policy are clarified. OEB did a limited examination of the stand-alone system. Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition Information Security System Manager (ISSM) verified IFT to be in a stand-alone configuration in accordance with its Authority To Operate (ATO) (see appendix I for reference to the ISSM report).
- **Operational Effectiveness.** As part of the USBP's layered approach to border security, the system's contribution to the USBP mission accomplishment was not fully evaluated during the LUT. OEB leveraged results from a Simulated Experiment (SIMEX) exercise that provided insights into IFT's contribution in providing a (b) (7)(E) capability (see appendix I for reference to the SIMEX report).
- **Operational Suitability.** Evaluation of the IFT's Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM) and Logistics (RAML) was limited to the LUT execution period. Limited access to the Contractor Maintenance and Logistics Support (CMLS) data further hindered the ability to provide an accurate evaluation of maintenance and logistical support of the

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system. Mean Logistics Delay Time is not reported because data was not available to evaluate the measure. The IFT CMLS contract gives the responsibility of recording maintenance data to the contractor. The Operational Test Team was not able to obtain this data.

Critical Operational Issue (COI) Evaluation Results

Operational effectiveness is defined as the IFT system's ability to support the user in accomplishing their specified operational mission and tasks. There are three possible outcomes:

- Operationally Effective – System fully supports the user's ability to accomplish their operational mission and tasks.
- Operationally Effective with Limitations – System supports the user's ability to accomplish their operational mission and tasks but limitations were observed.
- Not Operationally Effective – System did not support the user's ability to accomplish their mission and tasks.

Operational suitability is defined as the degree to which a system can be placed and sustained satisfactorily in field use with consideration given to availability, compatibility, transportability, interoperability, reliability, usage rates, maintainability, environment, safety, and occupational health risks, human factors, habitability, manpower, logistics, supportability, logistics supportability, natural environmental effects and impacts, documentation, and training requirements. There are three possible outcomes:

- Operationally Suitable – System can be placed and satisfactorily sustained in field use with no observed limitations.
- Operationally Suitable with Limitations – System can be placed and satisfactorily sustained in field use but with observed limitations that impact mission or task accomplishment relative to one or more of the suitability consideration attributes.
- Not Operationally Suitable – System cannot be placed in field use by the operator and/or cannot be sustained in field use by the operator.

Listed below are the COI evaluation findings. See section 3 for COI evaluation rationale.

Effectiveness Findings

E-1: Will IFT support CBP border security between the POEs?

- YES - The IFT system is operationally effective with noted limitations.
 - The IFT system is operationally effective for detecting IoIs at a range of (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) in the (b) (7)(E) AOR.

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- The IFT system is not operationally effective for identifying IoIs at a range of (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) in the (b) (7)(E) AOR.
- The IFT system is operationally effective for classification of (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] within the (b) (7)(E) AOR

Suitability Findings

S-1 Will IFT reliability support mission accomplishment?

- NO - The IFT system is not operationally suitable for reliability.
 - The Mean Time Between Critical Failure (MTBCF) (Not an ORD requirement) was measured during the LUT as (b) (7)(E). This result is provided for USBP consideration and end-user operational planning and management purposes.
 - (b) (7)(E).

S-2 Will IFT be maintainable?

- YES - The IFT system is operationally suitable for maintainability.

S-3 Will IFT availability support mission accomplishment?

- YES - The IFT system is operationally suitable for availability.

S-4 Will the IFT be logistically supportable?

- YES - The IFT system is operationally suitable for logistics supportability.

Other Operational Deficiencies and Operational Considerations

A total of (b) (7)(E) operational deficiencies and (b) (7)(E) operational considerations are identified in the IFT LUT IER. Please refer to IFT LUT IER section 4 for details and recommendations.

Revision History

Revision	Date	Description of Change
Rev A	19 Feb 2016	Original Release
Rev B	18 Apr 2016	Updated Exec Summary and Results Sections

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) chartered the Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA) to acquire the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems in support of CBP's long-range (b) (7)(E) needs. The IFT acquisition strategy is to acquire this operational capability from the commercial marketplace via full and open competition and to award a firm fixed price contract for the procurement of a number of operational IFT systems.

The IFT program is one of several programs resulting from the solutions engineering activity that culminated in the Arizona Technology Deployment Plan. It was determined that user needs, as specified in the IFT Mission Needs Statement (MNS), could best be met, in part, through the purchase and deployment of a number of fixed surveillance tower units (FSTU) equipped with various surveillance (b) (7)(E) and (b) (7)(E) to command and control centers (C2CEN). These surveillance systems provide the United States Border Patrol (USBP) with capability in (b) (7)(E) and Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Intelligence (C4I) to fill critical gaps in:

- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)

1.2 Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of the IFT LUT was to assess the Operational Effectiveness (OE) and Operational Suitability (OS) of the IFT when employed in live USBP operations per the IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) and LUT Test Plan. This LUT gathered relevant operational data to validate the IFT's capability to provide (b) (7)(E) in support of the USBP mission. The IFT LUT was intended to provide refinement of initial tactics and system employment procedures. System performance was evaluated against defined and derived performance criteria identified in the IFT Integrated Evaluation Framework (IEF). The data collected during this LUT, combined with previously collected data qualified for Operational Test (OT), was used to evaluate Critical Operational Issues (COIs) defined in the IEF and the resulting IFT LUT Test Plan. The determination of performance shortfalls in specific environments, or against specific category of threats, was provided for consideration of system employment in future USBP operations and contribute to the incremental improvement of future IFT design.

The Test Objectives (TO) of this event, as documented in the IFT TEMP, were as follows:

- Validate that the procured IFT system functions as an integral part of USBP's layered approach to border security
- Validate the Operational Capabilities of Interest (OCI) in the awarded IFT contract. OCIs directly trace to the IFT Operational Requirement Document (ORD)

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- Evaluate the operational impact of the operational requirements not included in the awarded contract
- Evaluate the Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Logistics (RAML) capability to support the continuous (b) (7)(E) mission

With respect to these objectives, the operational impact of the requirements not included in award contract was not evaluated during the LUT. However, during the week of 18-22 July 2016, the National Security Experimentation Laboratory (NSEL) at MITRE, McLean, VA will conduct an Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) Simulation Experiment (SIMEX). This Simulation Experiment (SIMEX 16-2) will explore select IFT operational requirements that are currently not implemented.

1.3 COIs

The COIs developed for the IFT LUT were designed to accomplish the test objectives outlined in the IFT TEMP.

The LUT evaluated the following Effectiveness COI:

- E-1 Will IFT support CBP border security mission between Ports of Entry (POE)?

The LUT evaluated the following Suitability COIs:

- S-1 Will IFT reliability support mission accomplishment?
- S-2 Will the IFT be maintainable?
- S-3 Will IFT availability support mission accomplishment?
- S-4 Will the IFT be logistically supportable?

1.4 System Description

The IFT system is designed to provide a (b) (7)(E) capability to enable Agents located within a station's command and control center (C2CEN) to effectively and efficiently conduct the critical border security mission tasks of detecting, tracking, identifying, and classifying Items of Interest (IoIs) in rural and remote areas. It also supports CBP in helping predict, deter, detect, track, identify/classify, respond, and resolve border security incursions.

The IFT system uses

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Since the IFT system enhances the operator's senses and the IFT operator must interact with the system to make decisions and determine the appropriate actions to take, the operator is considered part of the system.

1.4.1 FSTUs

The IFT system uses a series of FSTUs for IoI detection, tracking, identification, and classification. Each FSTU is (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Each FSTU is equipped with (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Each FSTU is equipped with a (b) (7)(E)

Power System

Each FSTU uses (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Wideband communication to and from the tower uses (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

A perimeter protection suite that includes an intrusion detection/alarm system, integrated Pan-

(b) (7)(E)

1.4.2 C2CEN

The C2CEN is located at the (b) (7)(E) Border Patrol Station (BPS). It includes workstations, displays, servers, storage, network switches, and Information Technology (IT) management systems to control and monitor the system's health.

Operator Workstation (OWS)/Console with COP

IFT workstations feature (b) (7)(E). Operators use (b) (7)(E). The OWS also provides video storage and retrieval capabilities.

Software Configuration

Table 1 details the LUT software configuration suite for the IFT's major components.

Table 1: IFT Software Configuration

Subcomponent	Software Configuration
C2CEN	(b) (7)(E)
Human/Machine Interface	
COP/C2 Border Control Application	
(b) (7)(E)	
Correlation Engine	
Training Simulation	
Digital Video Recorder	

1.4.3 Systems Interface Description

The IFT system (displayed in figure 1) consists of a COP located in the C2CEN that integrates and displays data from all IFT units deployed within the USBP Station's AoR, and supporting power and communications. Each IFT unit consists of (b) (7)(E)




Figure 1: IFT System Overview

2 OVERALL APPROACH

2.1 Event Documentation

Event documentation consisted of test planning documents (Test Plan, and Test Readiness Review Briefings), test execution documents and test reporting documents (Daily Status Reports, Quick Look Briefings, and Final Report). These documents are summarized as follows:

Test Planning Documents

- **Operational Evaluation Branch (OEB) Test Plan, OTIA05-IFT-71-150016.** This document provided the details of how the OEB / Independent Test Organization (ITO) test team planned to execute the LUT, record data and observations, analyze the data and execute the schedule of events.
- **Operational Test Readiness Review Briefings.** These briefings presented the readiness status of DT, the SUT, Test Documentation, Resources, and Contractor, Government and USBP personnel to Stakeholders to gain their concurrence and approval to proceed to commencement of independent OT.

Test Reporting Documents

- **Daily Status Reports.** These documents summarized the LUT daily activities, runs executed, Operational Test Observation Reports (TOR) generated, and plans for the next day of testing.
- **LUT Final Report, OTIA05-IFT-77-160004.** This document provides the detailed results of the test to include: COI Evaluation and Rationale, Major Quantitative and Qualitative Results, SUT/SoS Deficiencies, Operational Considerations, RAM Data, User Feedback, and Effectiveness and Suitability Findings and Recommendations.

2.2 Event Schedule

Table 2 is the LUT Event Schedule. The Detailed Execution Schedule is located in appendix C.

Table 2: LUT Event Schedule

Activity	Start Date	End Date
Test Readiness Review	10/23/2015	10/23/2015
Pre-test Activities	10/24/2015	10/25/2015
Runs for Record	10/26/2015	11/14/2015
Data Verification and Validation	11/15/2015	11/22/2015
Final Report	11/23/2015	02/19/2016

2.3 Event Location

This event was conducted at the (b) (7)(E) Station C2CEN and pre-designated locations within the (b) (7)(E) AoR where planned IoIs were positioned.

2.4 Event Design Overview

The LUT was conducted concurrently with live CBP operations, and incorporated CBP operational data as well as test data collected in controlled condition sets performed in the context of a scripted based operational scenario. Test vignettes grouped CBP and IFT mission tasks, permitting the evaluation of SUT performance in scripted and demonstration test events. Additional observational, examination, and administrative events were conducted in the continuous operational evaluation.

2.5 Event Conditions

The LUT as conducted from 26 October through 14 November 2015. Each test day was approximately eight hours in duration. In order to understand operational effectiveness and suitability in varying operational environment conditions (i.e., night versus day) and the full spectrum of USBP operations, each test day was offset by four hours. The test consisted of executing multiple vignettes based on the design of experiments and the test plan schedule of events. Typical, trained USBP IFT users were used while performing their routine (b) (7)(E) Station mission and tasks. Operational environment conditions were typical for the (b) (7)(E) AZ fall season (i.e., (b) (7)(E)). During the test, there were (b) (7)(E)

Lastly, real world Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) events/operations occurred simultaneously with the test trial/runs providing additional data and insights.

2.6 LUT Team Organization

Test team roles were executed per the LUT Plan. Table 3 lists the personnel that supported execution of the LUT. OEB was the Operational Test Authority (OTA). The United States Navy, Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COTF) was the Independent Test Organization (ITO), comprised of Government employees and CGI Contract Support.

The test was supported by (b) (7)(E) USBP agents, (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(E).

Table 3: LUT Team Organization

Position	Personnel	Organization
Operational Test Director (OTA)	Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	OTIA/OEB
Operational Test Manager	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	OTIA/OEB
Operational Test Director (ITO)	LT (b)(6);(b)(7)(C), USN	COTF/ITO
Data Collector / Data Analyst	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	COTF/ITO
Data Collector / Data Analyst	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	Contract Support/CGI

Position	Personnel	Organization
Test Execution Analyst / Data Collector/Logistics/Communication Coordinator	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	Contract Support/CGI
Data Collector	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	Contract Support/CGI
Data Analyst	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	Contract Support/CGI

2.7 User Feedback

The purpose of this data collection was to gather feedback from the IFT operators about IFT's ability to support their mission and tasks. The test team, assisted by the Human Factors Engineer, used Common Operating Response Environment (CORE) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) software and tablets to collect user feedback. This activity occurred throughout the 15-day LUT event from 26 October - 14 November 2015.


2.8 Simulation Experiment (SIMEX)

The USBP has a requirement to understand the operational effectiveness and the operational suitability of the IFT system and its overall contribution to the agency's multilayered approach to accomplishing border security. The LUT was conducted as the major part of the IFT Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) activities. One of the objectives of the LUT (Objective 1) is to "Validate that the procured IFT system functions as an integral part of USBP's layered approach to border security." This objective, as stated in the IFT TEMP, includes evaluating the following:

- IFT contribution to the multilayered coverage of the AoR
- IFT impact on resource utilization efficiency
- IFT impact on IoI resolution (e.g., detections, tracking, identification, elapsed time to resolve)

The SIMEX was conducted 26-30 January 2015 at the NSEL in McLean, VA. USBP agents from the (b) (7)(E) Border Patrol Station (BPS) participated in the event. The agents monitored the IFT system, Remote Video Surveillance System Upgrade (RVSS-U), UGS, and the Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) against simulated incursions of IoIs. Other USBP agents also participated remotely from the Tucson, AZ sector. These acted as field agents during the interdiction and apprehension of the IoIs.

Based on the results observed during the IFT SIMEX, it is evident that the planned IFT system will play an integral role in the layered approach to border security. The large area covered by (b) (7)(E)



locations. Feedback from the agents during the SIMEX on the IFT system was positive (see appendix I for reference to the SIMEX report).

3 RESULTS

All operational effectiveness and suitability results were accomplished using the procedures and data analysis described in the LUT Test Plan. For deviations, see appendix B.

3.1 Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results

Table 4 contains the operational context for the IFT system capability evaluation. These determinations consider all of the following factors:

- The ability of the system to support the user's ability to accomplish their operational mission and tasks,
- The ability of the IFT system to provide a (b) (7)(E)
- The user's ability to effectively and efficiently use and maintain the IFT system based on training provided;
- The sufficiency of the tactics, techniques and procedures exercised by the user; and
- The task saturation of the IFT system operator when attempting to accomplish their operational mission and tasks.

Table 4 provides the definitions for the criteria used to state the findings of an operational measure. All measures and test results are in appendix D.

Table 4: System Capability Evaluation Definitions

System Capability Evaluation Definitions	
Met	User able to accomplish the mission with the capability provided by the system
Met with Exception	User able to accomplish the mission with limited or no capability provided by the system
Not Met	User not able to accomplish the mission with the capability provided by the system

3.2 Usability Analysis Approach and Methodology

A usability analysis approach was implemented in order to evaluate the "ease of use" elements of the IFT system as part of the LUT. The goal of this approach was to collect and analyze user feedback within the context of nine critical operational areas. In addition, agents completed a System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire that measured perceptions of usability.

Trained USBP agents participated in the 15-day LUT event. (b) (7)(E) agents operated the system per shift (b) (7)(E) per day. Throughout the LUT, agents provided feedback using surveys stored on touch-screen tablets using the PNNL CORE system. Both

quantitative (rating scales) and qualitative (short fill-in) responses were collected. The 5-point Likert rating scale, one of the most common scaling methods for usability testing, was used to indicate “level of agreement” for usability statements as well as (b) (7)(E). In general, a rating response of 1 or 2 indicated a negative response, and a rating response of 4 or 5 indicated a positive response. A rating of 3 was considered a limit or “red line” value, indicating an area that may require closer investigation. Means for each of the ratings were calculated, and responses to short fill-in questions was summarized, collated, and analyzed for patterns. In addition, agents provided feedback during end-of-day hot washes and individual end-of-test interviews.

Table 5: Usability Analysis Results for Identification Range and Video Quality

Measure	Description	(b) (7)(E)	Distances	Results
(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)

Measure	Description	(b) (7)(E)	Distances	Results
			(b) (7)(E)	

3.3 Participants

A total of (b) (7)(E) CBP agents operated the system and comprised the sample size for the survey. Although agent experience varied across the (b) (7)(E) agents, each participant was experienced in field operations at the (b) (7)(E) Station, with an average of (b) (7)(E) experience. Most of the agents possessed significant experience in related systems such as Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), Mobile Surveillance System (MSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC). All agents had completed IFT Familiarization Training, Deployment Classroom Training, and/or Deployment Hands-on Training. Agents participated (b) (7)(E) The number of survey subjects, as well as their background and experience, provide a representative sample of users of sufficient sample size for the OE event.

3.4 Previous COI Assessment

OEB employed a continuous operational evaluation approach, and provided one Letter of Observation following the SAT. OEB leveraged data collected during the following events:

- SIMEX, 26 – 30 January 2015
- System Acceptance Test (SAT) in (b) (7)(E) AOR, June 22 – 25, 2015
- Deployment training, 29 June – 2 July 2015
- Operator Evaluation, 17 August – 30 August 2015

3.5 LUT COI Evaluation

COI E-1, Border Security

Will IFT support CBP border security mission between the POEs?

Results (Evaluated MET with exception)

The IFT was evaluated for its ability to provide a (b) (7)(E) capability to the Agents at the (b) (7)(E) station when conducting the border security critical mission tasks of: Detect, Identify and Classify IoIs. Operational environment conditions included day and night light conditions, remote environments, single IoIs, IoI groups, and conveyances. (b) (7)(E)

The following paragraphs give the major results for these three mission tasks.

Detect (Evaluated MET)

The IFT met all critical measure thresholds during the LUT. Outer radial detection range threshold (b) (7)(E) was met, with a maximum detection range observed (b) (7)(E). (b) (7)(E)

. Table 5 shows the results from the critical measures for the detect mission task.

Table 6: Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results - Detect

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Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Bold indicates a measure/result was evaluated NOT MET					

Identify (Evaluated NOT MET)

The identify task was evaluated as part of the overall (b) (7)(E) capability supporting the detect, identify, and classify sequence of border security tasks. For the LUT, given that the IFT radar detected an operational test run/trial, a successful IFT system identification depended on an operator-initiated investigation of the IFT radar detection. The IFT system identification was scored as successful when the operator, aided by (b) (7)(E) cameras made the determination that the detected IoI was (b) (7)(E) (IFT (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)

For all runs, successful IFT system identification occurred for (b) (7)(E) of the IFT (b) (7)(E) runs/trials. (b) (7)(E)

. Table 6 shows the results for the critical measures for the identify task.

Table 7: Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results - Identify

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Identify	(b) (7)(E)	Probability of identification. All Test Runs.	(b) (7)(E)		
		Probability of identification. (b) (7)(E)			
		Maximum identification time for an IFT operator to correctly identify (b) (7)(E) under typical operating conditions from IFT system video.			
Note: A (*) Denotes average					

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Bold indicates a measure/result was evaluated NOT MET					

Classify (Evaluated MET with Exception)

The IFT camera allowed the user to classify (b) (7)(E)




Table 7 shows the results for the critical measures for the classify task.

Table 8: Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results -Classify

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Classify	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)			

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Note: A (*) Denotes average Bold indicates a measure/result was evaluated NOT MET					

Appendix E contains a more detailed discussion and graphical depiction of the User Feedback responses about IFT operational effectiveness and suitability.

OPCON #1 in Section 4, Recommendations, provides a more detailed discussion of CONOPS and TTP gaps observed.

Effectiveness Deficiencies

Border Security effectiveness deficiencies identified during LUT are summarized in Table 6. Individual deficiency descriptions follow in the order listed. A deficiency summary table is provided in section 4, Table 7. Baseline deficiency definitions are described in Table 7, and the evaluation process flow is depicted in Figure B-1 of Appendix B.

Table 9: COI E-1, Border Security Deficiency Summary

COI E-1, Border Security Deficiency Summary				
No.	Title	Mission Area	COI	Level
1	(b) (7) (E)			
2				

COI E-1, Border Security Deficiency Summary				
No.	Title	Mission Area	COI	Level
3	(b) (7)(E)			
4				
5				

Table 7 contains the SUT and SoS baseline deficiency definitions used throughout the evaluation process.

Table 10: Baseline Deficiency Definitions

Baseline Deficiency Definitions	
Severe	Precludes mission accomplishment
Major 1	Critical impact on mission accomplishment
Major 2	Serious impact on mission accomplishment
Major 3	Moderate impact on mission accomplishment
Minor	No significant impact on mission accomplishment

(b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)

COI S-1, Reliability

Does IFT reliability support mission accomplishment?

(b) (7)(E)

Table 11: Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Reliability	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)			
<p>Note:</p> <p>Bold indicates a measure/result was evaluated UNSAT</p>					

(b) (7)(E)

The reliability of the IFT system to support completion of its mission was evaluated during LUT from October 26 - November 14, 2015 at the (b) (7)(E) AZ Border Patrol Station. Quantitative data were provided under IFT Contractor Maintenance Logistics Support, as documented in the contractor technical logs, and from Test Observation Reports.

(b) (7)(E)

COI S-2, Maintainability

Is the IFT maintainable?

(b) (7)(E)

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(b) (7)(E)

Table 12: Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Maintainability	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)			

COI S-3, Availability

Does IFT availability support mission accomplishment?

(b) (7)(E)

Table 13: Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Availability	(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)			

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
		(b)	(7)	(E)	

(b) (7)(E)

COI S-4, Logistic Supportability

Is IFT Logistically supportable?

(b) (7)(E)

Table 14: Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results

Major Quantitative and Qualitative Test Results					
Task Title	Measure	Critical Measure	Threshold	Results	Data
Logistic Supportability	M196	(b)	(7)	(E)	

4.1 LUT Deficiency Summary

(b) (7)(E)

Table 15: IFT LUT Deficiency Summary

IFT LUT Deficiency Summary				
No.	Title	COI	Level	Recommendation
(b) (7) (E)				

4.2 Operational Considerations (OPCONs)

OPCONs document considerations that inform operational users of significant aspects (pro and con) of system employment, or make clear to them what special measures would be required to make the system more efficient in operational use. Eleven effectiveness OPCONS were identified during LUT and are summarized in Table 9. Recommendations follow below.

Table 16: IFT LUT Operational Considerations Summary

IFT LUT Operational Considerations Summary			
No.	Related COI	Topic	Related Mission Area
1	E-1	(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)	
2	E-1		
3	E-1		
4	E-1		
5	E-1		
6	E-1		
7	E-1		
8	E-1		
9	E-1		
10	E-1		
11	E-1		
Note:		(b) (7)(E)	

OPCON Recommendations

Implement the following eleven OPCONS to enhance IFT system operations and C2CEN overall situational awareness.

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OPCON #1

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #2

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #3

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #4

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #5

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #6

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #7

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #8

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #9

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #10

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

OPCON #11

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

Appendix A DETAILED TEST DATA AND RESULTS

A.1 Background

This appendix presents specific MOE and MOS data referenced in the body of this report, which supports COI evaluation. Data are organized by COIs. Each Critical MOE or Critical MOS result are followed by the supporting data used to calculate the associated result. Validation success criteria and analysis methods used are described in appendix C of the IFT LUT Test Plan.

A.2 Effectiveness COI

Data used in the LUT evaluation was collected from these sources:

- SIMEX
- DT Data
- LUT data collected from:
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - (b) (7)(E)
- CBP Live Operations data records (b) (7)(E) IoI target of opportunity detection events that occurred during live operations.

A.2.1 COI E-1, CBP BORDER SECURITY

The CBP Border Security COI (E-1) was evaluated using the combined effect of the quantitative and qualitative measures associated with critical mission tasks Detect, Identify and Classify IoIs. This traceability for all measures is further described in Table E-1, Operational Requirements Traceability Matrix.

A.2.1.1 (b) (7)(E)
 (b) (7)(E). System detection distances from the LUT DOE are presented in Tables A-3.1 to A-3.3.

Table A-1: (b) (7)(E) Results Summary

(b) (7)(E)		Results	
Measure	Parameter	LUT Results	Threshold
(b) (7)(E)	(b)	(7)	(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Figure A-1:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)




Figure A-2: (b) (7)(E)

A.2.1.2 (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted content]

Table A-2: (b) (7)(E) Results Summary

(b) (7)(E)			Results
Measure	Parameter	LUT Results	Threshold
(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)		

Table A-3.1:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)



Table A-3.2: (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-3.3: (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

A.2.1.3

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-4: (b) (7)(E) Results Summary

(b) (7)(E)

Figure A-3 depicts (b) (7)(E) (exclusive of data found in run comments).




Figure A-3: (b) (7)(E)


A.2.1.4

(b) (7)(E)



Test limitations that contributed to this are as follows:

- 1)
- 2)
- 3)



(b) (7)(E)

Results are presented in Table A-5 and supporting data in Table A-6.

Table A-5:

(b) (7)(E)


Results Summary



(b) (7)(E)

Table A-6: (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)



A.2.1.5 (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)




Table A-7: (b) (7)(E) **Results Summary**

(b) (7)(E)

Tables A-8 and A-9 contain the supporting data for (b) (7)(E).

Table A-8: (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-9: (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

A.2.1.6

(b) (7)(E)

ively.

Table A-10:

(b) (7)(E)


(b) (7)(E)

Table A-11 contains the supporting data for

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-11: (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)



A.2.1.7 (b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)

As mentioned in Section 3.2 Table 5,

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-12:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-13:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Tables A-14 and A-15 contains the supporting data

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E).

Table A-14:

(b) (7)(E)


(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

Table A-15:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)



A.2.1.8

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-16:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-17:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)


A.3 Suitability COIs

The suitability COIs used in the LUT include Reliability, Maintainability, Availability and Logistic Supportability.

A.3.1 COI S-1 Reliability

A.3.1.1

(b) (7)(E)



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


Figure A-4: (b) (7)(E)

A.3.1.2

(b) (7)(E)

A large rectangular black redaction box covering the lower half of the page. At the top of this box, the text "(b) (7)(E)" is written in large, white, sans-serif font.

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(b) (7)(E)

Table A-18: Reliability Results Summary

Reliability Results			
Measure	Parameter	LUT Results	Threshold
(b) (7)(E)			

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-19: SUT Critical Failure Log

SUT Critical Failure Log							
Date	Element	FSTU #	Problem Description	Time Down	Fix Description	Time Up	Total Down Time
(b) (7)(E)							

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SUT Critical Failure Log							
Date	Element	FSTU #	Problem Description	Time Down	Fix Description	Time Up	Total Down Time
(b) (7) (E)							

~~For Official Use Only~~

SUT Critical Failure Log							
Date	Element	FSTU #	Problem Description	Time Down	Fix Description	Time Up	Total Down Time
(b) (7) (E)							

~~For Official Use Only~~

SUT Critical Failure Log							
Date	Element	FSTU #	Problem Description	Time Down	Fix Description	Time Up	Total Down Time
(b) (7) (E)							

~~For Official Use Only~~

SUT Critical Failure Log							
Date	Element	FSTU #	Problem Description	Time Down	Fix Description	Time Up	Total Down Time
(b) (7) (E)							

~~For Official Use Only~~

SUT Critical Failure Log							
Date	Element	FSTU #	Problem Description	Time Down	Fix Description	Time Up	Total Down Time
(b) (7) (E)							

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Table A-20 provides a summary of LUT RAM Data.

Table A-20: LUT RAM Data Summary

System Total Time	(b) (7)(E)	
System Uptime		
System Downtime		
Number of Critical Failures		
Mean Time Between Critical Failures		
Test Start Time		
Test End Time		
Mean Down Time		
System Availability Metric / FSTU Avail.		
Ao, Uptime to Total Time Ratio		

A.3.2 COI S-2 Maintainability

IFT Maintainability was evaluated using the following Measure: **(b) (7)(E)** MDT. Mean Down Time is defined as the average time that the IFT System, C2CEN, an FSTU, or other Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) or other equipment is not operational due to repair or preventive maintenance. Suitability data were collected during the 15-day LUT period. The IFT uses Contractor Maintenance Logistic Support. Results are presented in Table A-21.

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Table A-21: Maintainability Results Summary

Maintainability Results Summary			
Measure	Parameter	LUT Results	Threshold
Maintainability (b) (7)(E)	MDT	(b) (7)(E)	

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

A.3.3 COI S-3 Availability

IFT Availability was evaluated using the following Measures: (b) (7)(E) System Availability Metric (SAM) and ORD (b) (7)(E). SAM is calculated as the product of the C2CEN's availability multiplied by the combined average availabilities of all the FSTUs. A system is considered operationally available when it can perform per the operational requirements. A system is unavailable under normal operating conditions that preclude detecting, tracking, identifying, or classifying IoIs within an AoC (when the system would otherwise be capable of doing so).

Availability data were collected during the 15-day LUT period. (b) (7)(E)

The IFT uses Contractor Maintenance Logistics Support. LUT Results are presented in table A-22.

Table A-22: IFT Availability

Availability Results Summary			
Measure	Parameter	LUT Results	Threshold
System Availability Metric (b) (7)(E)	SAM	(b) (7)(E)	
Operational Availability ORD (b) (7)(E)	Ao		

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A.3.4 COI S-4 Logistic Supportability

IFT logistic supportability was evaluated using the following Measure: (b) (7)(E) The IFT system support provides 24/7 on-call technical assistance. Contractor call center personnel were observed to assist CBP personnel with technical issues when operators requested technical assistance. Table A-23 presents the Logistic Supportability Results Summary.

Table A-23: IFT Logistic Supportability Summary

IFT Logistic Supportability Summary			
Measure	Parameter	LUT Results	Threshold
Logistic Supportability (b) (7)(E)	The IFT system support provides 24/7 on-call technical assistance	SAT	No threshold

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A.4 (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-25

(b) (7)(E)




Figure A-6:

(b) (7)(E)

Table A-26

(b) (7)(E)





Figure A-7:  (b) (7)(E)

Appendix B EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

B.1 Test Conduct

The LUT was designed to collect data and evaluate IFT performance with respect to the COIs defined in Section 1. USBP Agents operated the system in the (b) (7)(E) AoR. The system was maintained using the contractor maintenance and logistics support. Personnel from OEB, ITO and USBP conducted the test event.

The contractor developed and conducted three different training events for the operators. Deployment training was conducted the week subsequent to the SAT. A two-day training event was conducted while the system was operational. During a two-day period, operators received 4-hour training sessions on the simulator. Some operators did not participate in all training events.

There was no consistency in scheduling operators to man the IFT workstations in the C2CEN.

(b) (7)(E) . This was determined by shift supervisor during the pre-shift muster.

Test team members participated in-group walks with BPAs. (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) .

Using the Continuous Operational Evaluation approach, the test team observed the System Acceptance Test (SAT) in June 2015. The ITO provided a Letter of Observation (LOO) based on their observations. The ITO Test Director participated in the operator deployment training. The test team also observed 1-week of the scheduled 2-week Operator Evaluation event.

B.2 Event Deviations

The following test plan event deviations occurred during the test:

- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) . The full event schedule as executed is found in Appendix C.

B.3 Limitations

B.3.1 Major

There were no major limitations to test.

B.3.2 Minor

The following minor limitation(s) had minimal impact on COI resolution and did not impact the ability to form conclusions regarding effectiveness and suitability:

B.3.2.1 Border Security, Cybersecurity (E-1)

(b) (7)(E)

B.3.2.2 Border Security, Detect (E-1)

(b) (7)(E).

B.3.2.3 Border Security, Detect (E-1)

(b) (7)(E)

B.3.2.4 Border Security, Detect (E-1)

(b) (7)(E)

B.3.2.5 Border Security, Detect (E-1)

(b) (7)(E)

B.4 OEB Evaluation Process

This LUT report provides a determination of effectiveness and suitability of the IFT system in the (b) (7)(E) AZ operational environment. The evaluation was based on the Continuous Operational Evaluation approach of the SUT, as observed during multiple integrated test periods and culminating in the dedicated LUT period. This was accomplished by using a Mission-Based Test Design (MBTD), developed in a trial process within OEB and documented in the draft IFT Integrated Evaluation Framework (IEF). The evaluation review process established in the LUT

Plan, presents a standardized, repeatable evaluative process for SUT performance, in order to: classify issues, characterize deficiencies, make overall COI resolutions, determine effectiveness and suitability, and make system deployment recommendations.

B.4.1 Definitions

OEB used the following definitions throughout the evaluation process.

B.4.1.1 SUT Deficiencies

Deficiencies noted during test that can be directly tied back to a specified or derived requirement that the USBP sponsor has funded the PM to deliver are listed in SUT deficiency paragraphs under the applicable COIs. The SUT evaluation was based on the contribution of the SUT, as defined by specified and derived requirements, to the SoS. SUT deficiencies were used in the resolution of appropriate COIs, SUT operational effectiveness and suitability determinations, and deployment recommendations.

B.4.1.2 SoS Deficiencies

Deficiencies noted during test that cannot be directly tied back to a threshold or derived requirement, but are necessary for mission accomplishment of the SUT when operating in the SoS environment, or are required for the full employment of the SUT in its intended SoS operating environment are listed in SoS deficiency paragraphs under the applicable COIs. SoS deficiencies were used in the resolution of appropriate COIs, and the SoS operational effectiveness and suitability determinations. However, there were no SoS issues identified during this test.

B.4.1.3 Deficiency

A deficiency is defined as lacking in some necessary quality, capability, or element or not up to a normal standard or complement. Operational capability is defined as an ability or means that is directly traceable to an approved requirement (i.e., ORD, FSD, CONOPS, etc.). Mission-essential capability is defined as an ability that is inherently necessary to complete an assigned mission.

B.4.1.4 Workaround

The particular issue can be resolved with additional training and/or experience such that the operator knows to do something (or not do something) that is otherwise not part of the normal training syllabus (operator compensation), or the operator solves the issue by taking some alternative course of action to accomplish the same result (work-around). To be acceptable, it must be an action, or series of actions, that can reasonably be accomplished by an average operator without excessive impact to other capabilities. It is important to note that operator compensation and work-around can be engineered into the training for system operators. An acceptable work-around cannot avoid use of the system.

B.4.1.5 Operational Consideration (OPCON)

OPCONs are used to document tactical considerations that inform supervisors of significant aspects (pro and con) of system employment, or make clear what special measures would be required to make the system more effective in operational use. Although it may present

supporting data or examples, it is not a deficiency paragraph by another name. It is a recommendation for the user to consider in the employment or management of the SUT and/or SoS in operational use.

B.4.1.6 Deficiency Evaluation Process

Figure B-1 contains the SUT and SoS baseline deficiency definitions flow diagram used throughout the evaluation process.

(b) (7)(E)



Figure B-1: Baseline Deficiency Definition Flow Diagram

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B.4.1.7 COI Evaluation

The resolution of COIs is addressed by satisfying the questions posed by the COIs. Derived from the MBTD process and IEF, the test plan provides an audit trail from the COI questions through the critical mission tasks to the critical system attributes and measures. This trail provides a logical flow path so that the disposition of COIs is directly related to the evaluation of each designed test. Thus, when a test parameter is quantitative, the COI resolution is based on actual results relative to the operational threshold. For non-quantifiable parameters, the COI resolution must be based on two factors: (1) observed results and (2) operational experience and judgment. Additionally, the number and severity of the deficiencies and their cumulative/aggregate impact on mission performance associated with the COI is considered for COI resolution. The resolution of COIs should be a subjective assessment of COI results by comparing adverse results against the full scope of the COI. In the end, the case should be clearly made to support weighing the positive test outcomes versus the negative outcomes for the critical mission tasks and subtasks. The audience should come away with a firm understanding as to why the scales tipped to either the positive (satisfactory) or negative (unsatisfactory). Potential COI resolution conclusions include: Resolved SAT or UNSAT, Unresolved, Split Resolution, or Not Tested.

B.4.1.7.1 Met

The COI was tested and resolved either SAT or UNSAT

B.4.1.7.2 Met with Exception

Used when a COI requires further testing for final resolution due to a major or severe limitation. This is used when the COI has been tested, but cannot be resolved.

B.4.1.7.3 Not Met

Used only when the COI was not tested during the particular phase of testing in which it was an issue for resolution. This may be due to the absence of a key test resource that poses a major or severe limitation to the test of the COI or it may be due to a decision by the Resource Sponsor to defer testing of certain aspects of the SUT until a future test period.

B.4.1.7.4 Effectiveness

Effectiveness is a combination of two concepts: does the system meet requirements and does the system maintain or improve mission capability when used by the operators. The evaluation of effectiveness is always a combination of these concepts. A good rule of thumb is: will the system make the user more effective than he/she was before?

B.4.1.7.5 Effective / Suitable

Ideally, all effectiveness / suitability COIs were completely and satisfactorily resolved, and there were no severe or major (1, 2, or 3) deficiencies. However, through the evaluative process, it is possible for the system to be determined effective / suitable with one or more major (1, 2, or 3) deficiencies and/or unsatisfactory COI resolutions. If as a result of deferrals or limitations to test, there are COIs or portions of COIs that remain unresolved/not tested, characterize the system effectiveness / suitability as accurately as possible and recommend additional OT&E to resolve these areas.

B.4.1.7.6 Not Effective

Regardless of the SUT performance when compared to the KPPs and the KSAs, if the operator is unable to successfully employ the system to accomplish the mission, it will be deemed not effective.

B.4.1.7.7 Not Suitable

Regardless of the SUT performance when compared to the KPPs and the KSAs, if the operator is unable to successfully maintain and sustain the system to deliver the required mission capability, it will be deemed not suitable.

Appendix C DETAILED TEST EXECUTION SCHEDULE

Table C-1 presents the detailed LUT daily test schedule as executed.

Table C-1: Daily Test Run Schedule

Vignett e	Run	IoI Type	IoI#	IoI Approa ch	(b) (7)(E)
1-2	(b) (7)(E)				

Vignette	Run	IoI Type	IoI#	IoI Approach	(b) (7)(E)
	(b) (7)(E)				

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Vignette	Run	IoI Type	IoI#	IoI Approach	(b) (7)(E)
	(b) (7)(E)				

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Vignette	Run	IoI Type	IoI#	IoI Approach	(b) (7)(E)
					(b) (7)(E)
1-3					
1-4					

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Vignette	Run	IoI Type	IoI#	IoI Approach	(b) (7)(E)
	(b) (7)(E)				
1-2					

Appendix D **OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS MATRIX**

Table D-1 provides a summary trace of operational requirements to Validated (SAT) or Failed (UNSAT) measures of effectiveness and suitability, LUT results, and threshold success criterion.

Table D-1: Operational Requirements Traceability Matrix

ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
MOEs								
A1	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A2								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A3								
A4								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
A5	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

~~For Official Use Only~~

ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

~~For Official Use Only~~

ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A6								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
A7	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A8								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A9								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
		(b) (7) (E)						

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7)(E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

~~For Official Use Only~~

ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A1 0								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A1 1								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
A1 2	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A1 3								

~~For Official Use Only~~

ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A1 4								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A1 5								

~~For Official Use Only~~

ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
A1 6	(b) (7) (E)							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
	(b) (7) (E)							
A1 7								

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
		(b) (7) (E)						
A1 8	Reliability							
A1 9	Availability							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
		(b) (7) (E)						
A20	Maintainability							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
		(b) (7) (E)						

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
		(b) (7)(E)						
A2 1	Logistic Supportability							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
		(b) (7) (E)						

~~For Official Use Only~~

ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
		(b) (7)(E)						
A2 2	Training							

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ID#	Attribute	Source	Para	M#	Standard		LUT Result	Type
					Measure	Criterion		
		(b) (7) (E)						
Notes: Grey highlighting of a row indicates the Attribute/Measure was Not in Scope/Orphaned for the LUT, and was not tested.								

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Appendix E **USER SURVEY RESPONSES**

E.1 Introduction

The following describes the approach and methodology used for collecting user feedback in support of Limited User Test.

E.1.1 Approach

A usability analysis approach was implemented in order to evaluate the “ease of use” elements of the IFT system as part of the LUT. The goal of this approach was to collect and analyze user feedback within the context of nine critical operational areas. In addition, agents completed a System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire that measured perceptions of usability.

Trained USBP agents participated in the fifteen-day LUT event. (b) (7)(E) agents operated the system per shift (b) (7)(E) per day. Throughout the LUT, agents provided feedback using surveys stored on touch-screen tablets using the PNNL CORE system. Both quantitative (rating scales) and qualitative (short fill-in) responses were collected. Means for each of the ratings were calculated, and responses to short fill-in questions were summarized, collated, and analyzed for patterns. In addition, agents provided feedback during end-of-day hot washes and individual end-of-test interviews.

E.1.2 Methodology

Participants

Per Figure E- (b) (7)(E) CBP agents participated in the LUT survey. Although agent experience varied (b) (7)(E) Most of the agents possessed significant experience in related systems such as RVSS, MSS, and MSC. Agents had completed a combination of IFT Familiarization Training, Deployment Classroom Training, and Deployment Hands-on Training. (b) (7)(E) the number of subjects (b) (7)(E) as well as their background and experience provided a representative sample of users of sufficient sample size for the test event.




Figure E-1: Agent Experience

Survey Development

Based upon the objective established for the user feedback portion of the LUT, nine categories were chosen for inclusion in the user feedback survey/interviews. These categories are as follows:

- (b) (7) (E)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

A total of eighty questions were developed for the one hundred and twenty-eight critical areas. Agents were also asked to prioritize a set of enhancements that were identified during the Operator Evaluation, an earlier test conducted as part of SAT. The survey utilized a combination of question types, to include rating scales, binary responses (i.e., yes/no) and open-ended follow-up questions. The 5-point Likert rating scale, one of the most common scaling methods for usability testing, was used to indicate “level of agreement” for usability statements as well as “frequency” in observing latency of the camera and image anomalies. In general, a rating

response of 1 or 2 indicated a negative response, and a rating response of 4 or 5 indicated a positive response. A rating of 3 was considered a limit or “red line” value, indicating an area that may require closer investigation. Below are examples of questions that were included in the survey.



Please comment on anything that (b) (7)(E) the above questions.

Data Collection Procedure

Over a fifteen-day period, each agent completed a survey. On Day 1, each agent received an introductory briefing that described the objectives of the LUT, shift schedule, survey, and instructions on completing the survey at the CORE site. Once agents had completed 3 shifts, they were encouraged to work on parts of the survey after each shift, ensuring that it was completed by the end of their participation in the evaluation. Given that this event represented some agents' first experience with IFT, we expected agents to be learning new skills as the event proceeded (i.e., learning curve). Therefore, we allowed agents to change their responses to survey questions at any time prior to the completion of the event, taking into account their improved skills and added experience. At the completion of the event, agents participated in individual wrap-up interviews with the human factors SME. Agents also completed an eleven question SUS questionnaire at the completion of the event.

E.2 Results

The quantitative (mean ratings) and qualitative (short fill-in) responses are provided as part of this report. Ratings, ranging from 1 to 5, were averaged across the (b) (7)(E) agents for each survey question and are presented by critical area. User comments were combined and analyzed for patterns and grouped where appropriate. A list of top issues and recommendations are also provided, based upon survey comments and wrap-up interviews.

E.2.1 (b) (7)(E)

Agents were asked to assess (b) (7)(E). Questions addressed (b) (7)(E)




Figure E-2: Mean Scores for (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in Figure E-2, mean scores ranged from (b) (7)(E)



E.2.2 (b) (7)(E)

Agents were asked to assess (b) (7)(E). Questions addressed (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) agents were also asked to provide comments regarding (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E).




Figure E-3: Mean Scores for (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in Figure E-3, mean scores ranged from (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

In the wrap-up sessions, agents reported that (b) (7)(E).

E.2.3 (b) (7)(E)

Agents were asked to evaluate (b) (7)(E). Questions addressed their overall satisfaction with the (b) (7)(E).




Figure E-4: Mean Scores (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in Figure E-4, mean scores ranged from

(b) (7)(E)



Agents also reported (b) (7)(E)

E.2.4 (b) (7)(E)

Agents were asked to assess th

(b) (7)(E)

Questions also addressed (b) (7)(E),

(b) (7)(E)




Figure E-5: Mean Scores for (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in Figure E-5, mean scores ranged from

(b) (7)(E)



E.2.5 (b) (7)(E)

Agents were asked to assess

(b) (7)(E)






Figure E-6: Mean Scores for (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in Figure E-6, mean scores ranged from (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

E.2.6 (b) (7)(E)

Agents were asked to assess

(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)

Questions addressed

(b) (7)(E)




Figure E-7: Mean Scores for (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in Figure E-7, mean scores ranged from (b) (7)(E) to (b) (7)(E). Agents would (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E).

E.2.7 (b) (7)(E)

Agents were asked to evaluate (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E). Results are depicted in three graphs below (i.e., positive, borderline, and negative ratings)



Figure E-8: Mean Scores for (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in Figure E-8, mean scores ranged from

(b) (7)(E)





Figure E-9: Mean Scores for (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in E-9, mean scores ranged from

(b) (7)(E)



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


Figure E-10: Mean Scores for Workstation Tools – (b) (7)(E)

As depicted in Figure E-10, mean scores ranged from (b) (7)(E)

Agents reported that

(b) (7)(E)


E.3 Key Issues and Recommended Enhancements

Two types of qualitative responses were collected. First, responses to survey short fill-in questions were summarized, collated, and analyzed for patterns. Second, agents provided feedback during end-of-test interviews with the human factors SME. The following describes key likes/dislikes, issues, and recommendations for improvements.

E.3.1 Positive Feedback from Agents

Overall, agents reported (b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)



E.3.2 Prioritization of HMI Improvements

As part of the survey, agents were asked to rate the importance of a set of HMI improvements that were identified during the Operator Evaluation. Agents rated each improvement using a 1-3 ratings scale, with 1 = not very important, 2 = moderately important, and 3 = extremely important.

(b) (7)(E)



E.3.3 System Usability Scale (SUS)

Agents completed a System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire that measured perceptions of usability. The SUS is a well-established, technology independent tool used to test “ease of use” on a variety of interfaces. Further, SUS has been shown to be a robust tool that is reliable (i.e., repeatability of the responses) and valid. SUS is a 10 item questionnaire with five response options (i.e. 1 = strongly disagree through 4 = strongly agree). An eleventh question was added to test for absolute usability using a seven-point scale (i.e., 1 = worst imaginable through 7 = best

imaginable). For the eleventh question respondents answered the following, “Overall, I would rate the user-friendliness of this product as _____”.




Figure E-11: System Usability Scale Results for IFT

As depicted in Figure E-11, the mean score for IFT on the SUS was (b) (7)(E)

It is expected that by implementing the improvements identified in Section E.3.2, future SUS scores would improve.

Appendix F RESOURCES

RESOURCE**PROVIDED****Test Articles****(b) (7)(E)** IFT

October 26 – November 14, 2015

Test Sites**(b) (7)(E)** Border Patrol Station

15 days

(b) (7)(E)

Test Targets and Expendables

(b) (7)(E)

CBP Personnel Test Support

(b) (7)(E)

Simulations, Models, and Test Beds

None

Special Requirements

(b) (7)(E)

Manpower/Personnel Training

(b) (7)(E)

Appendix G **DISTRIBUTION OF REPORT**

Copy to:

IFT Program Manager

OTIA

OBP

USBP

ORMD

(b) (7)(E) Station

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Appendix H **ACRONYMS**

Acronym	Definition
A _o	Operational Availability
AoC	Area of Coverage
AoI	Area of Interest
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ATO	Authority to Operate
(b) (7)(E)	
BPA	Border Patrol Agent
BPS	Border Patrol Station
C2	Command and Control
C2CEN	Command and Control Center
C2F	Command and Control Facility
C4I	Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Intelligence
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CMLS	Contract Maintenance Logistic Support
COIs	Critical Operational Issues
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COP	Common Operating Picture
CORE	Common Operating and Response Environment
COTF	Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force
DCS	Data Collection System
DID	Data Item Description
DMS	Data Management System
DOE	Design of Experiment
DT&E	Development Test and Evaluation
(b) (7)(E)	
FIPO	For USBP Information Purposes Only
FMV	Full Motion Video
FOR	Field of Regard
FOV	Field of View
FSD	Functional Specification Document
FSTU	Fixed Surveillance Tower Units
GDOS	General Dynamics One Source
GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
GUI	Graphic User Interface
IAA	Inter-Agency Agreement
ICSP	Integrated Contractor Support Plan
ID	Identification
IEF	Integrated Evaluation Framework
IFOV	Instantaneous Field of View
IFT	Integrated Fixed Tower

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Acronym	Definition
IoI	Item of Interest
(b) (7)(E)	
ISSM	Information Security System Manager
IT	Information Technology
ITO	Independent Test Organization
KPP	Key Performance Parameter
(b) (7)(E)	
LOO	Letters of Observation
LR	Long Range
LRU	Line Replaceable Unit
LSE	Lead System Engineer
LUT	Limited User Test
MBTD	Mission-based Test Design
MCT	Mission Capable Time
MDT	Mean Down Time
MLDT	Mean Logistics Delay Time
MNS	Mission Needs Statement
MPH	Miles Per Hour
MR	Medium Range
MSC	Mobile Surveillance Capability
MSS	Mobile Surveillance System
MTBCF	Mean Time Between Critical Failures
MTBF	Mean Time Between Failure
MTTR	Mean Time to Repair
(b) (7)(E)	
NVG	Night Vision Goggles
O	Objective
OBP	Office of Border Patrol
OCI	Operational Capabilities of Interest
OE	Operational Effectiveness
OEB	Operational Evaluation Branch
OTF	On-the-Job
OPCONs	Operational Considerations
ORD	Operational Requirements Document
OTIAOS	Operational Suitability
OSD	On-screen-display
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OT	Operational Test
OTA	Operational Test Authority
OT&E	Operational Test and Evaluation
OTIA	Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition

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Acronym	Definition
PD	Probability of Detection
PID	Probability of Identification
PM	Preventive Maintenance
PMO	Program Management Office
PNNL	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(b) (7)(E)	
PWS	Performance Work Statement
QLB	Quick Look Brief
QLR	Quick Look Report
RAM	Reliability, Availability and Maintainability
RAML	Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, And Logistics
RFR	Runs for Record
SAED	System Analysis and Evaluation Division
SAM	System Availability Metric
SAR	Shift Activity Report
SAT	System Acceptance Test / Satisfactory
SBI	Secure Border Initiative
SCD	Secondary Collective Display
SDR	System Definition Review
SE	Systems Engineering
SED	Systems Engineering Directorate
SIMEX	Simulation Experiment
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOC	Security Operations Center
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SoS	System of Systems
SR	Short Range
SUS	System Usability Scale
SUT	System Under Test
T	Threshold
TD	Test Director
TEGR	Test Event Gate Review
TEMP	Test and Evaluation Master Plan
TI	Time to Identify
TIR	Test Incident Report
TL	Test Lead
TO	Test Objectives
TOR	Test Observation Report
ToO	Target of Opportunity
TRB	Test Review Board
TRR	Test Readiness Review

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Acronym	Definition
TSR	Technical Service Requests
TT	Test Team
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures
	(b) (7)(E)
UNSAT	Unsatisfactory
USBP	United States Borer Patrol
VMS	Video Management System

Appendix I **REFERENCES**

Reference No.	Document No.	Document Description	Date
1.	OTIA05-IFT-00-000001	IFT ORD	September 27, 2011
2.	OTIA02-IFT-07-000050-Version A	IFT TEMP	November 20, 2013
3.	<i>OTIA05-IFT-71-150016</i>	IFT LUT Plan	June 23, 2015
5.	DHS CBP-002	U.S. Customs and Border Protection Security Classification Guide	July, 2013
6.	DOT&E Memorandum	DOT&E IFT LUT Test Plan	October 8, 2015
7.	OTIA05-RVSS-00140024	IFT Integrated Evaluation Framework	Beta
8.	150099Task5.2.01F	IFT Simulation Experiment	May 11, 2015
9.	DHS HQ	Security Assessment Report	Draft Report
10.	OTIA06-IFT-14-000005 Rev A	IFT System Acceptance Test Observation Final Report	August 18, 2015
11.	OTIA Decision Memorandum	IFT System Definition Review Memorandum	April 25, 2014